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AN  EVOLUTIONARY  APPROACH 
TO  PRE-PLAY  COMMUNICATION 
BY YONG-GWAN  KIM AND JOEL  SOBELi 
We add a round  of pre-play  communication  to a finite two-player  game played  by a 
population  of players.  Pre-play  communication  is cheap  talk in the sense that it does not 
directly  enter  the payoffs.  The paper  characterizes  the set of strategies  that are stable  with 
respect  to a stochastic  dynamic  adaptive  process.  Periodically  players  have an opportunity 
to change their strategy  with a strategy that is more successful against the current 
population.  Any strategy  that weakly  improves  upon  the current  poorest  performer  in the 
population  enters  with positive  probability.  When there is no conflict  of interest  between 
the players,  only the efficient outcome is stable with respect to these dynamics.  For 
general games the set of stable payoffs is typically  large. Every efficient payoff recurs 
infinitely  often. 
KEYWORDS: Game theory, evolution,  pre-play  communication,  cheap talk, adaptive 
behavior. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
ALTHOUGH  INFORMAL  STORIES  in game theory  emphasize  that pre-play  commu- 
nication allows players  to coordinate  on efficient Nash equilibria,  these stories 
are difficult  to capture  in full models of the communication  process.  The basic 
reason  for the difficulty  is that costless communication  can never  destroy  a Nash 
equilibrium.  If all but one player  decides to ignore everything  that is said and 
play according  to an equilibrium  strategy,  then the other player  can do no better 
than speak randomly  and also follow the equilibrium.  Several authors have 
approached  this problem by assuming that language exists and has a focal 
meaning obtained from its use outside the model. They continue by making 
behavioral  assumptions  that require players to believe the literal meaning of 
messages,  provided  that these meanings  do not violate strategic  aspects of the 
game. Papers  of Farrell  (1988),  Myerson  (1989), and Rabin (1994) are examples 
of this work. Our approach  is different. We do not assume that words have 
meaning  outside the model. Instead,  we show that if outcomes  satisfy  a stability 
condition  suggested  by adaptive  dynamics,  then pre-play  communication  effec- 
tively  eliminates  inefficient  equilibria. 
We add a round  of pre-play  communication  to a finite two-player  game. Each 
player  simultaneously  makes  a staitement  from  a finite language.  The statements 
are revealed  and then the underlying  game is played.  Pre-play  communication  is 
cheap talk in the sense that it does not directly  enter the payoffs. 
1This  manuscript  is a radically  revised  version  of a 1992  paper  with  the same  title. Kim  thanks  the 
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Foundation  and  NSF  for financial  support.  Thanks  go to Antonio  Cabrales,  Vincent  Crawford,  Eddie 
Dekel-Tabak,  Drew Fudenberg,  Martin  Hellwig,  Akihiko  Honda,  Avi Shmida,  Leo Simon,  Jeroen 
Swinkels,  Joel Watson,  seminar  audiences,  and three referees  for comments. 
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We characterize sets of strategies that are stable with respect to a stochastic 
dynamic adaptive process. We assume that there is a finite population of players 
who use pure strategies. Periodically a player has an opportunity to replace his 
strategy by a more successful  strategy. It is important for our results that the 
replacement process never ends (even when all strategies are performing equally 
well)  and that all strategies which weakly improve on the  poor performer are 
possible replacements. 
The  following example  illustrates how pre-play communication  enables  the 
population to move away from inefficient equilibria. The coordination game in 
Figure  1 has  two pure-strategy Nash  equilibria and a  completely  mixed one. 
There is no conflict of interest in this game and one  can supply many reasons 
why  experienced  players would  coordinate  on  the  efficient  equilibrium. The 
inefficient pure-strategy equilibrium is a problem for standard theory, however. 
If for some reason a player believes that other players will be playing BAD, they 
receive their highest payoff only if they play BAD  themselves. 
Without pre-play communication it is difficult to  see  how players can move 
away from the inefficient strict equilibrium since a unilateral deviation from the 
equilibrium strategy leads  to  a  strict decrease  in  payoff. When  players have 
more than one communication strategy before they reach the underlying game, 
the communication game will have no strict equilibrium; evolutionary pressures, 
which favor strategies that  do well  against the  existing population, force  effi- 
ciency. 
In this paper we demonstrate that evolutionary stability leads to efficiency in 
two-player games where the interests of the players coincide in a strong way. In 
the example it is not difficult to see why outcomes that induce the BAD  action 
are not stable. Suppose that the population has coordinated on an equilibrium 
in which the players always use a particular (normal) message. Everyone chooses 
the BAD action regardless of the message sent. As long as abnormal words are 
not used, however, there is no pressure to respond to them in a particular way. 
It is possible for an individual in the population to replace his strategy by one 
that sends the normal message, and plays GOOD  in the underlying game if and 
only if he meets another player who sends an abnormal message. This strategy 
does  as  well  as  the  original  strategy  and,  over  time,  it  is  possible  for  the 
population  to reach a state  in which everyone would respond to  an abnormal 
message with the GOOD action, although no one in the population actually uses 
the abnormal message. At this point a strategy that uses an abnormal message 
and then  always plays GOOD  does  better  than  the  existing population. This 
strategy can continue to replace any strategy that uses the BAD  action. Conse- 
quently, it thrives. Furthermore, once  the population has reached a configura- 
GOOD  BAD 
GOOD  2,2  0,0 
BAD  0,0  1,1 
FIGURE  1. PRE-PLAY  COMMUNICATION  1183 
tion  in  which every pair of  players is  able to  coordinate on  the  GOOD 
equilibrium,  it is not possible to move away  from this outcome. Eventually  the 
population  plays  the efficient  equilibrium  and when it does there is no pressure 
to move to an inefficient  outcome. 
In the next section we describe  the communication  game and the adjustment 
process that we study. Section 3 demonstrates  that, for games with common 
interests,  where there is only one efficient  payoff,  cheap pre-play  communication 
forces efficiency  under our evolutionary  dynamics.  In Section 4 we describe  an 
efficiency  result  for general  games:  Independent  of what strategy  the population 
plays initially,  every efficient payoff recurs infinitely  often. This result suggests 
that our dynamic  process  provides  little guidance  about how the game is played 
when the common-interest  assumption  fails. Section 5 extends the analysis  to 
games in which only one  player can speak. We show that if the speaker's 
preferred  outcome is a strict equilibrium,  then it is the only long-run  outcome 
observed under our assumptions.  Section 6  discusses related literature and 
variations  of our model. 
2. THE FRAMEWORK 
We begin with a given finite two-player  game,2  which we call the underlying 
game. We add to the game one round  of communication.  There is a finite set M 
of messages  (words)  that contains at least two elements. For most of the paper 
we assume that players have access to the same set of messages and speak 
simultaneously.  We discuss  the case in which only some of the players  can talk 
in Section 5. The strategies  of the players  in the communication  game are rules 
that specify a statement from M, and a function that maps the opponent's 
statement  into the set of strategies  in the underlying  game.  Payoffs  for this game 
are precisely  the payoffs  obtained  from the underlying  game. 
A  finite population plays this communication  game. Each member of  the 
population  is assigned  to play either the role of player  one or player  two. These 
players  use pure strategies.  Pairs  from the population  play the game repeatedly 
and anonymously.  On rare  occasions,  one member  of the population  changes  his 
strategy.  We look for stable sets of strategies  for adaptive  dynamics  satisfying 
the properties  described  below. 
Talk is cheap since the  messages do not enter payoff functions directly. 
Messages  influence  payoffs  only to the extent that they affect the actions  players 
choose in the underlying  game. 
For this class of games there is always  a Nash equilibrium  in which players 
play the same actions in the underlying  game for all communication  histories. 
Nash equilibrium  cannot force particular  statements  to have meaning  unless the 
statements are directly  linked to payoffs.  Nevertheless,  allowing  pre-play  com- 
2We limit  attention  to two-player  games  because  pairwise  contests  have  been the standard  setting 
for evolutionary  games.  If we assume  that all messages  can be heard  by all players,  then our results 
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munication  changes  the strategic  environment  in a fundamental  way.  Strict  Nash 
equilibria  in the underlying  game are no longer  strict  equilibria  in the communi- 
cation game. This observation  suggests  that processes  which  use communication 
to move the population  gradually  away  from inefficient  equilibria  could evolve. 
The outcomes  that we study  cannot ignore cheap talk. 
Formally,  let the underlying  game be (T, u),  where T = T1 x  T2 (Ti  is the 
finite strategy  set for a player  in role i), and u = (u1, u2). If the player  in role i 
uses strategy ti E  Ti for i = 1 and 2, then the payoff to a player in role j  is 
uj(t1,  t2). In the normal form of communication  game with message space M, 
role i's strategy  space is M x  TiMX  M,  and the payoff to a role j player  if role i 
uses strategy  (mi, ti(.)) E M x  TiMXM is 
(1)  Uj(m1,  t1(),  iM2, t2(  ))  = Uj(t1(M1, M2),  t2(m1,  M2)). 
There are 2N  individuals  (N  pairs) in the population.  We will assume that 
players  do not condition  their strategies  on the identity  of their opponent.  This 
assumption  makes more sense when the population  is large; our formal argu- 
ments require only that the  population be  finite. Denote  the  strategy of 
individual k  in role  i  by Oi(k) =  (mi, tif())  eM  x  TiMXM  A  population strategy 
profile is a list that specifies a strategy (01(n), 02(n)) for each agent n = 1,...,  N 
and role i = 1 and 2 in the population.  A strategy  profile  is homogeneous  if Oi(n) 
is  independent of  n  for  i = 1  and 2.  Given a  population strategy profile 
0=  (01(1),  02(1),...,  01(N), 02(N)),  the payoff functions U1 and U2 induce a 
population  payoff  for individual  k1 in role 1: 
(2)  A1(k1; 0)  =  E U1(01(kl), 02(n)) 
n 
and, for individual  k2 in role 2, 
(3)  U2(k2;  0)=  E  U2(01(n), 02(k2)). 
n 
That is, we compute  the population  payoff  for an individual  under the assump- 
tion that he is matched  exactly  once with everyone  assigned  to the other role in 
the population. 
Let 0/0j,(k) denote the strategy  profile  with Oi(k)  replaced  by OO(k).  We say 
that  01,(k) is  a  best response to  the  strategy  profile  0  if  U1(k;  /01,(k))  ? 
U1(k;  0/01(k))  for all pure strategies 01(k).  We say that 01,(k) improves upon 
01(k) if  U1(k;  0/01,(k))  > U1(k;  0).  Similar definitions hold  for a player in the 
second role. 
We assume that the population starts at an arbitrary  strategy profile. To 
simplify  analysis,  we assume that in each round each player meets all of the 
other members of the population and plays the communication  game once. 
Hence if the strategy  profile at the beginning  of a round is 0, then the payoffs 
from that round  are given by (2) and (3). At the end of the round,  one member 
of  the  population has the  opportunity  to  change his strategy. In order to PRE-PLAY  COMMUNICATION  1185 
describe the dynamic  behavior  of our system,  we must specify the probability 
that any  member  of the population  is allowed  to change  his strategy  and identify 
the strategy  that he changes  to. These probabilities  in principle  could depend  on 
the entire history  of play.  In what follows  we assume  that the probability  that an 
individual  is permitted  to replace  his strategy  at the end of a round  depends  only 
on  the current population strategy profile. The probability  that he  picks a 
particular  replacement  strategy  depends  only on the individual  and the current 
population strategy  profile. This stationarity  assumption  simplifies exposition, 
but is not necessary for our results. To handle more general specifications, 
substitute  "with  probability  bounded  away  from zero" for "with  positive  proba- 
bility"  in Assumptions  (S), (R), and (BR) below. We maintain  four assumptions 
about the dynamic  process. 
ASSUMPTION (I):  Exactly  one member  of the  population  may  change  his strategy 
each round. 
ASSUMPTION (S):  Some  individual  who  performs  worst  in his role  in a round  has 
the opportunity  to change  his strategy  with  positive  probability. 
ASSUMPTION  (R):  Any strategy  that improves upon the strategy  being replaced is 
adopted  with  positive  probability. 
ASSUMPTION  (NL): A strategy  that does not improve  upon the agent's current 
strategy  cannot  be adopted. 
Assumption  (I) states that adjustments  are individual.  This condition  simpli- 
fies exposition.  We use Assumption  (I) to guarantee  that efficient payoffs are 
stable in common-interest  games. Assumption  (S) is a  selection condition. It 
requires that the evolutionary  process replace poorly performing  strategies. 
Assumption  (R) requires  that the replacement  process be sufficiently  rich that 
any strategy  that weakly improves  upon an existing strategy  may be adopted. 
Under our evolutionary  dynamics  players  may change  to strategies  that perform 
relatively  well, although not necessarily  optimally.  The third assumption  also 
requires  that there be a positive  probability  that strategies  not currently  repre- 
sented may replace existing strategies. This property  would not hold for a 
deterministic  biological  dynamic  (where any strategy  that is not present in one 
generation cannot appear in subsequent generations).  While (R) rules out a 
best-response dynamic  that requires the replacement  strategy  be an optimal 
response  to the current  population,  the results  of Sections  3 and 5 would  hold if 
we made the following  weaker  assumption: 
ASSUMPTION  (BR):  Any strategy  that responds optimally to the population strat- 
egy  is adopted  with  positive  probability. 
Assumption (NL) assumes that agents can avoid strategies that perform 
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to no loss. Qualitatively  our results  would not change if there is a probationary 
period after which strategies that are new to  the population are replaced 
immediately  if they fail to outperform  their predecessor. 
Let A(0)  be the set of strategy  profiles that can be reached with positive 
probability  starting from the profile 0. We extend this notation to  sets of 
population  profiles:  For any set of profiles (,  A(e)  is the union of A(0)  for 
0 E- (.  e  is  absorbing if  A(e)  c  (.  Call a minimal, nonempty, absorbing set 
stable.  Since the set of all strategy  profiles is absorbing  and finite, stable sets 
exist. In fact, each absorbing  set must contain a stable set. It is straightforward 
to check that 
(4)  the intersection  of absorbing  sets is absorbing  and 
(5)  for each 0,  A(e)  is absorbing. 
By (4) two stable sets coincide or are disjoint.  By (5) a stable set 0*  satisfies 
A(O*)-  =9*  and  also  for  each  0,  there  exists  a  stable  set  (*  such  that 
(*  cA(O). 
We call strategies  that occur infinitely  often with positive probability  recur- 
rent; other strategies are transient.  For our model the recurrent  profiles are 
precisely  the elements  of stable sets. A profile  that is not an element of a stable 
set must be transient  (since, by (R), whenever  the profile arises it is eventually 
replaced  with positive probability  by an element of a stable set, and once the 
population  profile  is in a stable set it never leaves).  A profile  that is an element 
of a stable set must be recurrent  (otherwise  there is a smaller absorbing  set 
contained  in the stable set). 
We use the structure  of stable sets explained  above  to prove  our main  results. 
Given a population  strategy  profile 0, we identify elements of A(O) by using 
properties (S) and (R). In particular,  if  a  population strategy profile 0'  is 
obtained  from 0 by making  changes  in how players  respond  to unsent  messages, 
then 0' e A(0). We refer to this type of change as drift. 
3.  GAMES  WITH  COMMON INTEREST 
In  this  section  we  assume  that  the  set  of  feasible  payoffs  F= 
{(u1(t1,  t2), u2(t1,  t2)):  ti E Ti} of the underlying  game has a unique  point (u*, u*) 
that strongly  Pareto-dominates  all other feasible payoffs  (so that if (U1, U2)  E F, 
(u1, u2) *  (u*I, u*2) implies  that ui < u  for i = 1 and 2). In this case we say that 
the game has common  interests.  A game with common  interests  need not have a 
unique efficient action as several strategy combinations  may give rise to the 
payoff  (u*, u*). Denote by (*  the set of all population  strategies  that give rise 
to these payoffs  (that is, the set of strategies 0 such that Ui(k;  0) = u0 for all 
k=  1, .. .,N  and i=  1 and 2). 
PROPOSITION  1:  In any game with common interests, if there are at least two 
messages, then the set  (9*  of all strategy  profiles that give rise to efficient  payoffs is 
stable. PRE-PLAY  COMMUNICATION  1187 
PROOF:  It is sufficient to  prove that  A()=  -  *  for all  0 E 6Y*. First note 
that 0 E 0*  implies  that A(6) c 0*.  Suppose  that individual  k in role 1 has an 
opportunity  to replace his strategy.  (NL) guarantees  that the new strategy  must 
lead to a payoff  of u*. Since (u*, u*) is the unique  weakly  efficient  point of the 
game, each role two player in the population  must obtain u* when matched 
against  individual  k's new strategy. 
It remains  to show  that 0 E &*  implies  * cA(6).  Fix 6' E &*. It is possible 
for the population  strategy  to drift to a configuration  in which all players  in a 
given role use the same strategy  (for example,  if one by one individuals  in role 
one adopt  the same best response  to the population  strategy,  and then individu- 
als in the second role do the same). Call the messages  used under this strategy 
(Mi1, Mi2). If these messages  are not used in 6', responses  to the other messages 
can drift so that they agree with 6', and a series of replacements  can lead the 
population  to 6'. Otherwise,  the following  sequence of replacements  arises  with 
positive  probability:  responses  to another  pair of messages  drift to actions that 
support  the efficient  payoff;  all individuals  use these messages;  the response  to 
(M1, IM2)  drifts to the response played under 0'; the responses to the other 
messages  drift  so that they agree with 0'; and individuals  replace  their signaling 
strategies  with the ones in 6'. 
Proposition  1 requires  that M, the set of messages,  has at least two elements. 
If there are two different  ways to achieve the efficient payoff in the underlying 
game, and M contains  only one element, then there will be distinct  stable sets 
supporting  each equilibrium. 
In order  to guarantee  that once the population  arrives  at an efficient  payoff  it 
is sure to stay there, we must use (NL). If inferior  strategies  enter with positive 
probability,  then play could depart 6*.  We would obtain the same qualitative 
result if we weaken (NL) but require that any new strategy that does not 
perform  as well as the strategy  that it replaces is immediately  replaced.  This 
dynamic  behavior  would  be guaranteed  if we assumed  that only those individuals 
using the least successful strategy in the current population are replaced (a 
property  that is consistent  with  (S)). Under these conditions  once the population 
arrives  at a strategy  in &9*  it stays close in that the population  strategy  profile 
differs  from an element in &* by the strategy  of at most one individual. 
Stability  of (9* could also be destroyed  if we weakened (I) to permit many 
individuals  to change their strategies  simultaneously. 
Proposition 1 guarantees that the  set  of  strategy profiles leading to  the 
efficient payoff is a stable set for common-interest  games. Next we show that 
there is a unique stable set of profiles,  and that this set contains an efficient 
point. Combined  with Proposition  1 it establishes  that pre-play  communication 
forces efficiency  in common-interest  games. 
PROPOSITION  2: In any game with common interests,  if there  are at least two 
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PROOF: For i =  1 and 2, let u0'  be the highest feasible payoff  for a player  in 
role i of the underlying  game; let (a1,  a)  be strategies  in the underlying  game 
that give rise to a payoff (u*,ut).  Let  0*  denote the homogeneous  strategy 
profile in which each individual  in the population  sends the same message m 
and, independent  of the messages  sent, an individual  in role i plays ai. We will 
show that 0* eA(0)  for all 0. It follows  that 0* is an element of any absorbing 
set; hence it is an element of any stable set. Since stable sets either coincide  or 
are disjoint,  there is a unique stable set, and it contains 0*. 
Through  a series of replacements  we can transform  an arbitrary  population 
profile  0 first  to a homogeneous  profile  in which  unused  messages  lead to payoff 
ul*,  then to a strategy  profile  in which  role one players  actually  attain  this payoff, 
and finally to  0*.  One by one,  each agent in  role one  can be  given an 
opportunity  to replace his strategy  with the same optimal  response to the role 
two strategies  currently  in the population;  suppose  this leads agents  to send the 
message m'. These changes can occur (with positive probability)  while the 
strategies  of the role two players  remain fixed. Next, the role two players  can 
switch (one by one) to a strategy that responds optimally  to the first role's 
strategy.  This strategy  can be selected to have the property  that role two players 
take action a2  in response to  an unsent message m" (independent of  the 
message that role two players themselves send). Next, change the strategy  of 
every  role one player  so that they all send m"  and take action a1 independent  of 
the message  that they hear from  their opponent.  Since u* is the largest  feasible 
payoff for a role one player, this replacement  satisfies (NL) (indeed, it is an 
optimal response to  the population strategy).  At  this point the population 
strategy  profile  is homogeneous  and leads to the payoff u* for role one players. 
To obtain the strategy  0*, let role two players  modify  their strategies  so that 
they all send the message m and take a2 in response  to every  message;  and let 
role one players modify their strategies (if m"  i  m) so that they too send m. 
Propositions  1 and 2 guarantee that in common-interest  games there is a 
unique stable set, and it contains precisely those strategies that lead to effi- 
ciency.  The logic behind the result is plain. If the population  is outside of this 
set, it can drift  to a profile  in which  there is an unused  message,  and agents can 
use this message to coordinate  on a good outcome. When there are common 
interests,  the population  gets stuck  once everyone  obtains  an efficient  payoff.  A 
direct consequence of  these  results is  that  payoffs converge globally in 
common-interest  games.  The.payoff  to an individual  in role i must converge  to 
the efficient  payoff, u*, with probability  one. 
Since all of the replacements  used in the proofs  of Propositions  1 and 2 satisfy 
(BR), existence and uniqueness  of a stable set in common-interest  games holds 
under  (BR) (instead of (R)). 
4.  GENERAL  GAMES 
When the common-interest  assumption  fails, the set of outcomes that arise 
infinitely  often is large. The next result,  which follows from a simple modifica- PRE-PLAY  COMMUNICATION  1189 
tion of the proof of Proposition  2, states that the stable set of any communica- 
tion game must include the efficient  frontier  of the set of stage-game  payoffs. 
PROPOSITION  3: For any game with  pre-play  communication  with at least two 
messages  there  is a unique  stable  set. For any  efficient  payoff  in the underlying  game, 
the stable  set contains  a homogeneous  strategy  profile  yielding  that  payoff. 
Rather than provide  a proof of this result, we shall illustrate  the result with 
the  prisoner's dilemma game. Suppose that the  population was playing a 
homogeneous  profile in which every agent used the same message and cheated 
no matter what his opponent said. Through a sequence of replacements,  the 
strategies  of the role two individuals  could change so that they all respond  to an 
unsent message with the cooperative action. Finally, through a sequence of 
replacements,  the strategies of the role one players can change so that these 
players  are using the previously  unsent message  (but still cheating).  As a result, 
the role one players  receive their highest payoff  (even though this payoff  could 
not be achieved  in a static equilibrium).3  It is straightforward  to show that the 
population  can move  with positive  probability  to a configuration  in which  players 
in role one receive their highest payoff from any initial specification  of the 
population.  This configuration  is not a stable one: when role two players  have an 
opportunity  to adjust  their strategy,  they will cheat again.  Hence the population 
moves  from configurations  that are preferred  by one type of agent, to configura- 
tions that are inefficient,  to configurations  that are good for the other type of 
agent. Without providing  more details about the transition probabilities,  we 
cannot say how much time the process will spend at efficient outcomes. Our 
dynamic  does not limit the set of possible  predictions  when the underlying  game 
lacks common  interests.  The uncontrolled  drift  off the equilibrium  path permit- 
ted by (R) leads to this result. 
5. NONE-SIDED  COMMUNICATION 
In the literature  that assumes  language  has a focal meaning,  it is generally  the 
case  that if  only one  player is  able to  communicate, then  that player is 
guaranteed  to achieve  his favorite  outcome.  This result holds in our framework.4 
Imagine that only players in the first role are able to  send messages. The 
argument  of Proposition  2 demonstrates  that a population  profile in which the 
agent who is able to speak receives his highest feasible payoff must be  an 
element of every stable set. Hence there is only one stable set. 
3If instead the role one players  used the previously  unsent message and then cooperated,  a 
replacement  that satisfies  (R) but not (BR), the population  would  move  to an outcome  in which  both 
plal'ers  cooperate. 
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We can also prove  a version  of the efficiency  result  of Section  3. If player  one 
obtains his highest payoff only at a strict equilibrium,  then the only stable 
population  profiles  must  give rise to this equilibrium.  As long as role one players 
receive their highest payoff, only other role one strategies that lead to the 
highest  payoff  can enter the population.  When the equilibrium  is strict,  no role 
two strategy  that lowers  a role one player's  payoff  can enter the population.  We 
summarize  these results  in Proposition  4. 
PROPOSITION 4:  Assume that only players in role one may signal prior to playing 
the underlying  game. Let w1 be the highest  feasible payoff for a player in role one of 
the underlying  game. There is a unique stable set of population strategies.  w*  is a 
payoff to role one players associated with a homogeneous population profile con- 
tained in the stable set. If the only way to obtain the payoff w* for role one players is 
in a strict equilibrium  in the underlying  game, then role one players must receive w 
at each element of the stable set. 
Proposition  4 holds if the assumption  that the role-one player's  equilibrium  is 
strict is replaced by the weaker condition:  w* = u1(t*, t*)  and t2  an optimal 
response  to t1 implies  that u1(t , t2) = w  . This condition  holds in all common- 
interest  games. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this section  we note limitations  and extensions  of our approach  and briefly 
discuss  related  papers. 
It is traditional  in evolutionary  models to view players  as being drawn  from a 
single population.  Assuming that players are drawn  from a single population 
leads to difficulties  that we believe are artificial.  Cheap  talk is needed not only 
to provide  a myopically  attractive  way to avoid inefficient  strict equilibria,  but 
must also be used to create asymmetries.  Our basic results  for common-interest 
games  remain  true in this setting  nonetheless,5  provided  that there exists  at least 
one unsent message for each individual  in the population,  and that we replace 
(S) with the more restrictive  assumption  that the probability  that any individual 
has the opportunity  to change his strategy  at the end of a round is positive.6 
Assuming that there are at least two messages for each individual  in the 
population  guarantees  that in any population  strategy  profile  there is an unused 
message  for each individual.  When the population  is finite, agents  can use these 
extra messages  to determine  their roles in the game. In an infinite  population, 
symmetric  model, Schlag (1993) demonstrates  that one  cannot rely on  the 
replicator  dynamic  to guarantee  efficiency  even in games where players'  have 
identical  payoffs. 
5Details of the argument are available from the authors. 
6Our  previous results continue to hold under (BR) if (S) is strengthened in this way. PRE-PLAY  COMMUNICATION  1191 
Without  placing  more structure  on the model, it is not possible to state how 
long it would take for the population to reach a stable set, but our proofs 
suggest  that convergence  could be slow. The particular  set of replacements  that 
we identify requires one side of the population to change its strategy  while 
strategies  of the individuals  on the other side do not change.  While other paths 
to the efficient outcome exist, we have not identified  them, and the population 
could remain  at an inefficient  outcome  for a long time. This intuition  appears,  in 
a different form, in Banerjee and Weibull (1993) and Schlag (1993). These 
papers demonstrate  that inefficient outcomes can be dynamically  stable with 
respect to the replicator  dynamic. 
The richness  assumption  (R) permits  us to conclude that stable sets contain 
efficient  outcomes;  it also leads to our conclusion  that there are many  recurrent 
outcomes  in games that do not have common  interests.  We exploit  the property, 
implied by (R) (or (BR)), that replacement  strategies may have arbitrary  re- 
sponses  to unsent messages.  In particular,  nothing  prevents  players  from  using a 
strongly  dominated  strategy  of the underlying  game in response to an unsent 
message. While we think that it is plausible  to permit changes in off-the-equi- 
librium-path  behavior, economic agents, even those with limited rationality, 
should  be able to avoid  certain  responses.  An earlier  version  of this paper  (Kim 
and Sobel (1992))  studied  the outcomes  that satisfy  the static stability  condition 
developed  by Swinkels  (1992).  This condition  requires  new strategies  to be best 
responses to the population  that arises after the entry. Kim and Sobel (1992) 
show that this notion of evolutionary  stability  forces efficiency  in common-inter- 
est games  provided  that there are unsent messages.  In contrast  to the analysis  of 
this paper,  however,  one could not guarantee  the existence of unused messages 
without  making  another  assumption  in addition  to common  interests.7 
Robson (1990) considers  the possibility  of creating extra strategies  in evolu- 
tionary  games. These strategies  play the same role communication  does in our 
model. Robson demonstrates that adding a  strategy forces cooperation in 
coordination  games and destabilizes  the inefficient outcome in the prisoner  s 
dilemma. 
Matsui (1991) applies a variation  of the Gilboa and Matsui (1991) idea of 
cyclically  stable sets, which correspond  roughly to the steady-states  of best- 
response  dynamics,  to show that the only cyclically  stable set in 2 x 2 common- 
interest games with pre-play  communication  contains only efficient equilibria. 
The efficiency  result does not generalize  to larger  games because mixed strate- 
gies are permitted  and there may be no guarantee  that there exists an unused 
message that agents can use as a way to move to an efficient  outcome. 
Sobel (1993) presents existence and efficiency results for common-interest 
games  with pre-play  communication  using a static evolutionary  stability  concept. 
He obtains an efficiency  result for general common-interest  games assuming  a 
finite population  of players  who use only pure strategies.  The results  in Section  3 
7Bhaskar  (1992)  and Kim and Sobel (1992)  demonstrate  that the unsent messages  may  not exist 
when mixed  strategies  are permitted. 1192  YONG-GWAN  KIM AND  JOEL  SOBEL 
and 4 of this paper go beyond Sobel (1993) because they rely on an explicit 
dynamic  process, permit a more general class of replacements,  and do not 
require  large message spaces. Sobel (1993) uses the stability  concept to obtain 
efficiency  results for two different types of common-interest  games, infinitely 
repeated  games and incomplete-information  games with cheap-talk.  It contains 
a survey  of other papers (Bhaskar  (1992), Fudenberg  and Maskin  (1991), Kim 
and Sobel (1992), and Warneryd  (1991)) that apply static evolutionary  stability 
equilibrium  concepts  to cheap-talk  games. 
Matsui  and Rob (1991)  and N6ldeke,  Samuelson,  and van Damme  (1991)  have 
shown that only efficient outcomes arise as limits of an evolutionary  dynamic 
process  in pure-coordination  games  with pre-play  communication.  These papers 
assume that the  population of  players is  finite; that players have periodic 
opportunities  to change their strategies;  and that mistakes  or mutations  occur 
and cause the models to have a unique ergodic distribution,  which they show 
converges  to the set of efficient payoffs as the probability  of mistakes  goes to 
zero. Because mutations are permitted,  the dynamics  in these papers do not 
satisfy  (NL). Our result that cheap talk forces efficiency  holds more strongly  in 
our model than in theirs in two senses. First  the class of common-interest  games 
strictly  includes  the coordination  games that they study.  Second  our assumptions 
guarantee that once the population coordinates on an efficient outcome, it 
remains  there. 
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